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Vested	  Interests,	  Venue	  Shopping,	  and	  Policy	  Stability:	  	  The	  Long	  Road	  to	  Improving	  Air	  Quality	  in	  Oregon’s	  Willamette	  Valley	  	  Aaron	  J.	  Ley	  Assistant	  Professor	  Department	  of	  Political	  Science	  University	  of	  Rhode	  Island	  Kingston,	  RI	  02881	  ajley@uri.edu	  	  	  	  Abstract:	  A	  lot	  of	  scholarly	  attention	  has	  focused	  on	  why	  groups	  choose	  to	  pursue	  their	  policy	  goals	  in	  one	  venue	  over	  another.	  This	  manuscript	  adds	  to	  the	  literature	  by	  testing	  a	  new	  theory	  of	  venue	  shopping,	  the	  Adaptive	  Venue	  Shopping	  Framework.	  	  This	  manuscript	  finds	  empirical	  support	  that	  groups	  choose	  venues	  by	  strategically	  assessing	  the	  institutional	  context	  which	  involves	  three	  primary	  elements:	  the	  group's	  mix	  of	  resources,	  their	  opponent's	  resource	  strengths,	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  venue	  accessibility,	  which	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  opponents	  degree	  of	  control	  over	  a	  venue	  and	  a	  venue's	  image	  amiability	  or	  receptivity.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  confirming	  these	  findings,	  this	  case	  study	  links	  the	  literature	  on	  venue	  shopping	  with	  recent	  scholarship	  about	  “vested	  interests”	  by	  demonstrating	  how	  a	  powerful	  agricultural	  group	  came	  to	  dominate	  in	  a	  legislative	  venue,	  how	  it	  protected	  its	  policy	  victories	  from	  reversal,	  and	  how	  it	  kept	  policymaking	  from	  shifting	  into	  alternative	  venues,	  thus	  leading	  to	  long-­‐term	  policy	  stability.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  demonstrates	  how	  newly	  emerged	  groups	  can	  achieve	  policy	  success	  against	  stronger	  opponents	  by	  threatening	  to	  seek	  their	  policy	  goals	  in	  alternative	  institutions.	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I. Introduction	  
	  	  	   If	  there	  is	  an	  uncontested	  political	  reality	  in	  American	  politics	  it	  is	  that	  multiple	  venues	  are	  available	  to	  groups	  seeking	  to	  dislodge	  the	  hard-­‐fought	  policy	  successes	  of	  past	  political	  victors.	  	  When	  political	  actors	  are	  successful	  at	  protecting	  their	  policy	  victories	  from	  reversal,	  they	  produce	  the	  policy	  stability	  that	  has	  become	  such	  a	  well-­‐known	  feature	  of	  American	  politics.	  	  This	  policy	  stability	  is	  an	  attribute	  of	  governance	  that	  receives	  less	  scholarly	  attention	  than	  traditional	  work	  focusing	  on	  the	  factors	  driving	  policy	  change.	  	  As	  Terry	  Moe	  (2015)	  puts	  it:	  Change	  is	  rooted	  in	  stability,	  and	  any	  effort	  to	  build	  a	  productive	  theory	  of	  change	  must	  take	  full	  advantage	  of	  what	  the	  theory	  of	  stability	  already	  has	  to	  tell	  us…about	  the	  forces	  of	  resilience	  that	  protect	  the	  status	  quo	  (p.	  283)	  	  While	  it	  is	  critically	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  activities	  of	  reformers	  in	  producing	  policy	  change,	  it	  is	  equally	  important	  to	  “understand	  the	  vested	  interests	  that	  oppose	  them	  and	  that	  regularly	  weaken,	  distort,	  or	  sidetrack	  major	  change”	  (Moe	  2015,	  p.	  302).	  	  We	  quickly	  forget	  that	  today’s	  “forces	  of	  resilience,”	  were	  at	  one	  time	  yesterday’s	  political	  newcomers	  who	  also	  agitated	  for	  policy	  change,	  at	  times	  seeking	  to	  shift	  policymaking	  into	  venues	  offering	  them	  the	  best	  opportunities	  for	  changing	  policy.	  	  What	  happens	  when	  we	  place	  “vested	  interests”	  at	  the	  center	  of	  our	  political	  analysis	  and	  what	  can	  we	  learn	  about	  the	  venue	  choices	  that	  these	  powerful	  groups	  made	  before	  coming	  to	  dominance?	  And,	  most	  importantly,	  how	  do	  these	  groups	  insulate	  their	  policy	  victories	  from	  reversal,	  thus	  creating	  the	  policy	  stability	  that	  is	  such	  an	  enduring	  feature	  of	  American	  politics?	  	  	  	  	  There	  is	  no	  shortage	  of	  recent	  scholarship	  that	  examines	  the	  strategies	  of	  groups	  as	  they	  are	  choosing	  venues	  for	  pursuing	  their	  policy	  goals	  (e.g.,	  Ley	  and	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Weber	  2015;	  Buffardi,	  et	  al.	  2015).	  	  This	  paper	  uses	  the	  first	  ever	  empirical	  case	  study	  of	  an	  environmental	  policy	  conflict	  in	  the	  Pacific	  Northwest,	  the	  problem	  of	  agricultural	  field	  burning	  in	  Oregon,	  to	  explore	  how	  an	  emergent,	  but	  later	  dominant,	  agricultural	  interest	  group	  chose	  among	  the	  various	  venues	  that	  were	  available	  to	  it.	  	  This	  analysis	  advances	  theory	  in	  the	  area	  of	  venue	  shopping	  by	  providing	  the	  first	  empirical	  test	  of	  the	  “Adaptive	  Venue	  Shopping	  (AVS)	  Framework,”	  a	  synthetic	  venue	  shopping	  framework	  arguing	  that	  boundedly	  rational	  groups	  select	  venues	  by	  assessing	  the	  institutional	  context	  and	  adapting	  their	  strategies	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  learning	  what	  does	  and	  does	  not	  work.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  If	  initial	  venue	  choices	  are	  important	  for	  winning	  policy	  victories,	  then	  insulating	  those	  policy	  victories	  from	  reversal	  becomes	  an	  important	  next	  step	  that	  is	  underexplored	  by	  scholars	  interested	  in	  the	  venue	  choices	  of	  groups.	  	  Along	  with	  finding	  support	  for	  the	  AVS	  Framework,	  this	  manuscript	  links	  the	  venue	  shopping	  literature	  with	  Moe’s	  (2015)	  recent	  insights	  about	  policy	  stability	  by	  demonstrating	  how	  “vested	  interests”	  produce	  “institutional	  inertia.”	  	  	  Institutional	  inertia,	  introduced	  here	  as	  a	  key	  source	  of	  gradual	  and	  incremental	  policymaking	  with	  path	  dependent	  characteristics,	  occurs	  when	  policy	  problems	  are	  thrust	  into	  specific	  policymaking	  venues	  and	  remain	  there	  even	  though	  newly	  emerged	  groups	  prefer	  venue	  changes.	  	  Interests	  can	  become	  “vested”	  and,	  thus,	  produce	  institutional	  inertia	  by	  developing	  strategies	  that	  provide	  organizational	  leaders	  with	  strong	  financial	  motivations	  to	  institute	  “blocking”	  strategies	  that	  keep	  policy	  from	  being	  acted	  upon	  or	  that	  keep	  policy	  from	  drifting	  into	  new	  and	  inhospitable	  venues.	  	  	  To	  demonstrate	  how	  industry	  groups	  successfully	  fend	  off	  efforts	  to	  change	  their	  
	   4	  
practices,	  I	  use	  a	  case	  that	  involves	  a	  “focusing	  event”	  that	  should	  have	  produced	  significant	  policy	  change	  or,	  at	  the	  least,	  shifted	  the	  issue	  into	  new	  policymaking	  venues.	  	  	  That	  a	  focusing	  event	  of	  the	  magnitude	  described	  in	  this	  case	  failed	  to	  shift	  policymaking	  into	  new	  venues,	  or	  to	  advance	  meaningful	  policy	  change,	  demonstrates	  how	  organizations	  can	  manufacture	  strong	  motivations	  for	  its	  members	  to	  create	  the	  institutional	  inertia	  and	  long	  periods	  of	  policy	  stability,	  in	  this	  case	  lasting	  twenty	  years,	  that	  precede	  policy	  change.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  examining	  the	  strategies	  undertaken	  by	  groups	  that	  seek	  to	  insulate	  their	  policy	  victories	  from	  reversal,	  this	  manuscript	  also	  examines	  the	  experiences	  of	  groups	  that	  emerge	  to	  successfully	  challenge	  tough	  cases	  of	  policy	  entrenchment.	  	  Even	  though	  well-­‐established	  groups	  enjoy	  clear	  advantages	  after	  having	  spent	  years	  insulating	  their	  policy	  victories	  from	  reversal,	  newly	  emerged	  groups	  can	  level	  the	  playing	  field	  through	  their	  persistent	  efforts	  to	  shift	  venues	  or	  by	  simply	  threatening	  to	  shift	  policymaking	  into	  newer	  venues.	  	  The	  efforts	  in	  this	  case	  were	  made	  successful	  because	  a	  loosely	  coordinated	  coalition	  of	  interests	  acted	  together	  through	  a	  state	  legislative	  policy	  entrepreneur	  who	  credibly	  threatened	  to	  use	  legislation	  to	  resolve	  the	  longstanding	  policy	  problem	  through	  a	  state	  referendum.	  	  	  	  	  	  Before	  presenting	  a	  case	  study	  of	  field	  burning	  politics	  in	  Oregon,	  this	  paper	  begins	  by	  describing	  the	  various	  theories	  that	  are	  used	  to	  understand	  the	  activity	  of	  venue	  shopping.	  	  This	  discussion	  of	  theory	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  section	  that	  describes	  the	  methods	  used	  to	  create	  an	  in-­‐depth	  case	  study	  of	  field	  burning	  in	  Oregon,	  followed	  by	  a	  thick	  description	  of	  field	  burning	  politics	  in	  Oregon.	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II. Theoretical	  Advancements	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Venue	  Shopping	  and	  the	  AVS	  
Framework	  	   Ever	  since	  E.E.	  Schattschneider	  (1963)	  wrote	  that	  groups	  pressing	  for	  policy	  change	  increase	  their	  chances	  of	  success	  by	  expanding	  the	  scope	  of	  political	  conflict,	  scholars	  began	  examining	  “why”	  and	  “how”	  groups	  chose	  policymaking	  venues	  for	  pursuing	  their	  policy	  goals.	  	  What	  emerged	  from	  all	  of	  this	  scholarly	  activity	  was	  a	  diverse	  body	  of	  venue	  shopping	  theory	  that	  remained	  a	  collection	  of	  seemingly	  disparate	  ideas.	  	  The	  AVS	  Framework	  attempts	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  among	  the	  various	  theoretical	  approaches	  that	  are	  used	  to	  understand	  the	  activities	  of	  venue	  choice.	  	  	  	   The	  AVS	  Framework	  is	  a	  synthetic	  venue	  shopping	  theory	  that	  adopts	  Cairney’s	  (2013)	  perspective	  that	  “new	  combinations	  of	  theories	  or	  concepts	  may	  produce	  new	  perspectives	  and	  new	  research	  agendas”	  (p.	  1).	  	  Like	  many	  of	  the	  theories	  described	  below,	  a	  fundamental	  assumption	  of	  the	  AVS	  Framework	  is	  that	  boundedly	  rational	  individuals	  and	  groups	  make	  decisions	  about	  pursuing	  their	  policy	  goals	  in	  multiple	  decision-­‐making	  venues.	  	  The	  AVS	  Framework	  places	  its	  primary	  emphasis	  on	  the	  institutional	  context	  as	  a	  critical	  factor	  that	  shapes	  the	  decision	  calculus	  of	  these	  boundedly	  rational	  groups	  as	  they	  are	  choosing	  venues.	  	  This	  institutional	  context	  involves	  a)	  a	  group’s	  level	  of	  political,	  technical,	  or	  legal	  resources	  for	  approaching	  certain	  venues,	  b)	  whether	  a	  group’s	  opponent	  possesses	  superior	  resources	  and	  dominates	  in	  certain	  venues,	  and	  c)	  whether	  venues	  are	  receptive	  to	  the	  group’s	  preferred	  framing	  of	  the	  issue	  or	  conflict	  (see	  Ley	  and	  Weber	  2015).	  	  To	  the	  AVS	  Framework	  institutional	  context	  matters	  a	  great	  deal,	  but	  this	  institutional	  milieu	  tells	  only	  part	  of	  the	  story	  because	  another	  fundamental	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assumption	  of	  this	  theory	  is	  that	  boundedly	  rational	  groups	  are	  capable	  of	  adaptive	  learning	  during	  the	  course	  of	  long-­‐term	  policy	  processes	  (Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith	  1999).	  	  If	  groups	  are	  capable	  of	  adapting	  their	  strategies	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  they	  have	  learned,	  then	  past	  failures	  or	  initial	  venue	  choices	  do	  not	  always	  predict	  future	  success.	  	  In	  fact,	  past	  failures	  or	  “bad”	  choices	  may	  sow	  the	  seeds	  for	  future	  success	  in	  that	  groups	  may	  learn	  new	  strategies,	  develop	  greater	  technical/scientific	  expertise,	  or	  bolster	  political	  resources	  that	  can	  be	  used	  in	  future	  policy	  battles.	  	   The	  AVS	  Framework	  that	  is	  described	  above	  owes	  its	  creation	  to	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  working	  in	  diverse	  theoretical	  traditions.	  	  Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith	  (1999)	  formulated	  a	  rational	  choice	  explanation	  of	  venue	  choice	  grounded	  in	  bounded	  rationality	  and	  argued	  that	  groups	  seeking	  policy	  change	  in	  multiple	  venues	  select	  those	  venues	  producing	  the	  most	  or	  best	  policies	  at	  the	  least	  cost.	  	  Lubell	  and	  colleagues	  (2010)	  accepted	  many	  of	  these	  same	  assumptions	  in	  their	  Ecology	  of	  Games	  approach	  but	  place	  primary	  emphasis	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  
multiple	  policymaking	  venues	  available	  to	  boundedly	  rational	  political	  actors.	  	  They	  found	  that	  actors	  who	  are	  involved	  in	  these	  policy	  games	  come	  to	  prefer	  certain	  venues,	  but	  also	  shift	  or	  adapt	  to	  alternative	  venues	  when	  new	  opportunities	  for	  success	  arise.	  	  Sarah	  Pralle	  (2003)	  found	  similar	  evidence	  that	  groups	  develop	  preferences	  for	  certain	  venues,	  but	  argued	  that	  these	  preferences	  cause	  some	  groups	  to	  miss	  opportunities	  in	  other	  venues.	  	  	  Her	  most	  important	  insight	  is	  how	  structural	  barriers,	  such	  as	  standing	  to	  sue	  in	  court	  or	  rules	  about	  agency	  decision-­‐making,	  make	  some	  venues	  unavailable	  to	  groups	  altogether.	  	  Finally,	  no	  discussion	  of	  venue	  choice	  is	  complete	  without	  a	  hat	  tip	  to	  Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  (1993),	  who	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argued	  that	  groups	  manipulate	  how	  issues	  are	  framed	  so	  that	  their	  most	  preferred	  policy	  venue,	  the	  one	  that	  gives	  them	  the	  best	  chance	  of	  advancing	  their	  policy	  goals,	  become	  susceptible	  and	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  group’s	  position.	  	   	  The	  key	  theoretical	  insight	  advanced	  by	  the	  AVS	  Framework	  is	  that	  newly	  formed	  groups	  are	  found	  to	  be	  guided	  into	  certain	  venues	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  “easy	  choices”	  (see	  Table	  1).	  	  The	  best	  choices	  occur	  in	  venues	  where	  groups	  possess	  more	  political,	  technical,	  or	  legal	  resources	  than	  their	  opponents.	  	  Groups	  also	  gravitate	  toward	  those	  venues	  that	  are	  most	  receptive	  to	  the	  group’s	  framing	  of	  the	  issue,	  or	  to	  venues	  where	  their	  opponents	  do	  not	  yet	  dominate.	  	  Table	  1	  About	  Here	  “Easy	  worst	  choices”	  constitute	  venues	  where	  opponents	  possess	  more	  resources	  than	  the	  group	  choosing	  venues.	  	  Groups	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  avoid	  venues	  when	  their	  opponents	  dominate	  them	  or	  a	  group’s	  framing	  of	  the	  issue	  does	  not	  align	  with	  the	  authoritative	  decision-­‐makers	  who	  control	  the	  venue.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  strategic	  choices	  groups	  make	  when	  they	  are	  choosing	  venues	  are	  not	  always	  easy,	  but	  the	  AVS	  Framework	  serves	  as	  both	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  to	  understand	  group	  decision-­‐making	  and	  a	  practical	  blueprint	  for	  guiding	  group	  decisions.	  	  
III. Research	  Methodology	  This	  paper	  employs	  a	  case	  study	  of	  the	  agricultural	  practice	  of	  field	  burning	  in	  Oregon’s	  Willamette	  Valley	  to	  empirically	  test	  the	  AVS	  Framework	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  to	  examine	  the	  dynamics	  of	  policy	  entrenchment,	  and	  to	  explore	  how	  tough	  cases	  of	  policy	  entrenchment	  are	  reversed.	  	  Case	  study	  methods	  are	  employed	  when	  investigators	  are	  seeking	  to	  explain	  how	  and	  why	  actors	  behave	  as	  they	  do	  (Yin	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2009).	  	  Single	  case	  studies,	  especially	  if	  they	  take	  on	  the	  form	  of	  “unique”	  cases,	  have	  been	  found	  to	  advance	  and	  test	  past	  theoretical	  insights	  in	  powerful	  ways	  (Yin	  2009).	  	  The	  analysis	  embodied	  in	  this	  case	  is	  unique	  because	  prior	  studies	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  venue	  shopping	  activities	  of	  groups	  pursuing	  better	  public	  health	  outcomes,	  environmental	  goals,	  or,	  more	  broadly,	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods.	  	  Here	  the	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  type	  of	  groups	  that	  scholars	  of	  venue	  shopping	  have	  long	  neglected;	  namely,	  industry	  groups	  that	  hold	  different	  motivations	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  their	  goals.	  	  Motivated	  by	  the	  pursuit	  of	  members’	  private	  economic	  goals,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  venue	  shopping	  activities	  of	  these	  groups	  may	  differ	  from	  groups	  that	  pursue	  public	  goods	  because	  they	  are	  seeking	  protection	  from	  the	  state,	  not	  through	  the	  state.	  	  	  It	  can,	  therefore,	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  single	  case	  meets	  the	  definition	  of	  what	  Yin	  (2009)	  calls	  a	  “unique”	  case,	  which	  can	  potentially	  establish	  more	  confidence	  in	  the	  external	  validity	  of	  research	  findings	  reported	  from	  past	  tests	  of	  the	  AVS	  Framework,	  while	  also	  fulfilling	  the	  well-­‐established	  scholarly	  practice	  of	  observing	  policy	  change	  over	  a	  time	  period	  spanning	  multiple	  years	  (Weible	  2007).	  	  	  This	  case	  study	  required	  traveling	  throughout	  Oregon	  to	  interview	  the	  various	  stakeholders	  who	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  ending	  and	  defending	  the	  practice	  of	  burning	  agricultural	  fields	  of	  crop	  residue.	  	  A	  snowball	  sampling	  method	  was	  used	  to	  contact	  individuals	  for	  semi-­‐structured	  personal	  interviews	  that	  lasted	  between	  30-­‐120	  minutes.	  	  Twelve	  activists,	  lawyers,	  public	  health	  professionals,	  medical	  doctors,	  grass	  seed	  lobbyists,	  and	  state	  legislators	  agreed	  to	  speak	  about	  a)	  how	  they	  selected	  venues	  to	  pursue	  their	  policy	  goals	  or	  b)	  how	  the	  status	  quo	  was	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defended	  against	  insurgent	  groups	  seeking	  to	  disrupt	  the	  policy	  status	  quo.	  	  By	  employing	  a	  snowball	  sampling	  method,	  it	  became	  possible	  to	  meet	  people	  who	  worked	  behind	  the	  scenes	  and	  who	  chose	  not	  to	  publicly	  participate	  in	  the	  policy	  conflict.	  	  These	  interviews	  were	  supplemented	  with	  primary	  and	  secondary	  source	  documents	  from	  newspaper	  archives	  and	  the	  State	  Archives	  in	  Salem,	  Oregon	  where	  historical	  documents	  related	  to	  agricultural	  field	  burning	  and	  the	  legislative	  and	  administrative	  policy	  responses	  to	  it	  were	  collected	  and	  examined.	  The	  section	  below	  explains	  why	  agricultural	  field	  burning	  was	  a	  problem,	  how	  policymakers	  first	  approached	  the	  problem,	  followed	  by	  an	  in-­‐depth	  case	  study	  of	  how	  groups	  struggled	  to	  resolve	  the	  conflict.	  	  	  
IV. Agricultural	  Field	  Burning	  in	  Oregon	  Oregon	  is	  home	  to	  the	  most	  successful	  grass	  seed	  farmers	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  who	  produce	  nearly	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  all	  U.S.	  grass	  seed	  varieties	  (Tippens	  1989).	  	  	  Growers	  claimed	  that	  burning	  leftover	  crop	  residue	  made	  their	  success	  possible	  because	  it	  killed	  fungus,	  weeds,	  and	  other	  pests	  that	  affected	  the	  growth	  process.	  	  	  The	  amount	  of	  acreage	  burned	  every	  year	  varied,	  but	  farmers	  in	  Oregon	  burned	  up	  to	  235,000	  acres	  of	  crop	  residue	  per	  year.	  While	  growers	  benefited	  from	  field	  burning,	  the	  residents	  of	  Oregon’s	  Willamette	  Valley,	  which	  includes	  the	  urban	  area	  of	  Eugene,	  Oregon,	  internalized	  the	  diffuse	  costs	  of	  smoke.	  	  During	  the	  1960s,	  the	  grass	  smoke	  began	  mixing	  with	  other	  types	  of	  pollution	  and	  the	  air	  quality	  became	  so	  bad	  that	  one	  journalist	  wrote:	  	  During	  days	  when	  a	  weather	  inversion	  is	  present,	  the	  smoke	  billows	  from	  the	  flaming	  fields	  to	  mingle	  with	  any	  industrial	  or	  automotive	  pollution	  and	  fog	  which	  is	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already	  present,	  and	  then	  remains	  suspended.	  	  The	  smoke-­‐fog	  combination	  forms	  a	  thick	  blanket	  over	  the	  Willamette	  Valley	  –	  carrying,	  then	  dropping,	  particles	  of	  black	  ash	  (Schaink	  1964).	  	  The	  stark	  visual	  reality	  of	  the	  deteriorating	  air	  quality	  conditions	  in	  proximity	  to	  such	  large	  population	  centers,	  coupled	  with	  growing	  recognition	  that	  pollution	  has	  harmful	  health	  effects,	  made	  field	  burning	  the	  proverbial	  “low-­‐hanging”	  fruit	  for	  Eugene	  legislators	  seeking	  to	  regulate	  point-­‐source	  pollution.	  	  The	  various	  actors	  involved	  early	  in	  Oregon’s	  field	  burning	  conflict	  included	  the	  Eugene	  City	  Council,	  whose	  members	  argued	  that	  the	  poor	  air	  quality	  caused	  by	  grass	  smoke	  was	  a	  nuisance	  and,	  worse,	  a	  menace	  to	  public	  health.	  Although	  active	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  conflict,	  the	  City	  Council	  was	  displaced	  by	  the	  Sierra	  Club,	  state	  legislators,	  and	  public	  health	  organizations,	  such	  as	  the	  Oregon	  Medical	  Association,	  American	  Lung	  Association,	  and	  a	  group	  called	  Western	  Environmental	  Law	  Center,	  who	  all	  pooled	  their	  resources	  together	  to	  end	  field	  burning	  in	  Oregon’s	  Willamette	  Valley	  in	  2009.	  	  	  Farmers,	  for	  their	  part,	  responded	  to	  the	  growing	  opposition	  toward	  field	  burning	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  by	  forming	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council,	  a	  grass	  seed	  trade	  association	  funded	  through	  per-­‐acre	  burning	  fees,	  that	  represented	  grass	  growers	  before	  the	  legislature	  and	  argued	  that	  the	  economic	  costs	  of	  regulation	  outweighed	  its	  public	  health	  benefits.	  	  Funding	  the	  organization	  through	  per-­‐acre	  burning	  fees	  gave	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  executive	  director	  a	  powerful	  incentive	  to	  protect	  as	  many	  acres	  as	  possible	  from	  regulation	  because	  fewer	  acres	  eligible	  for	  burning	  meant	  a	  smaller	  pot	  of	  potential	  organizational	  revenue.	  Other	  agricultural	  groups,	  such	  as	  the	  Cattleman’s	  Association	  and	  the	  Oregon	  Farm	  Bureau,	  supported	  the	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Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  overall	  strategy	  of	  representing	  farmers	  before	  Oregon	  policymakers.	  	  Together,	  they	  sought	  to	  keep	  agencies	  from	  regulating	  the	  practice,	  and	  even	  took	  legal	  action	  in	  the	  1980s	  to	  dismantle	  efforts	  by	  Oregon	  citizens	  to	  end	  field	  burning	  through	  a	  ballot	  measure	  campaign,	  but	  most	  of	  their	  success	  was	  achieved	  through	  their	  primary	  strategy	  of	  managing	  the	  scope	  of	  field	  burning	  conflict	  in	  legislative	  committees	  and	  not	  in	  other	  venues.	  	  	  
V. Venue	  Shopping,	  Vested	  Interests,	  and	  Disrupting	  the	  Forces	  of	  
Resilience.	  The	  case	  study	  of	  field	  burning	  politics	  in	  Oregon	  is	  separated	  into	  three	  sections	  that	  respectively	  correspond	  to	  this	  study’s	  contribution	  to	  venue	  choice	  scholarship,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  policy	  entrenchment,	  and	  insights	  about	  the	  tactics	  of	  groups	  that	  seek	  to	  reverse	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  Section	  A	  tests	  the	  AVS	  Framework	  by	  demonstrating	  how	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  made	  its	  initial	  venue	  choices	  and	  achieved	  policy	  success	  in	  doing	  so.	  	  Section	  B	  follows	  by	  demonstrating	  how	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  successfully	  insulated	  its	  policy	  victory	  from	  reversal	  by	  instituting	  a	  long-­‐term	  legislative	  strategy	  that	  allowed	  it	  to	  block	  legislation	  from	  being	  acted	  upon.	  	  Finally,	  Section	  C	  demonstrates	  how	  newly	  emerged	  environmental	  groups	  and	  their	  allies	  were	  able	  to	  overcome	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  industry	  group	  by	  threatening	  to	  shift	  policymaking	  into	  new	  venues.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
A.	  The	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  Adaptive	  Venue	  Shopping	  Efforts	  to	  address	  Oregon	  field	  burning	  began	  when	  the	  City	  of	  Eugene	  created	  an	  air	  pollution	  control	  agency	  in	  1957	  and	  alerted	  state	  authorities	  that	  air	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quality	  in	  the	  Willamette	  Valley	  airshed	  was	  growing	  worse.	  	  In	  light	  of	  these	  concerns,	  officials	  from	  the	  state’s	  environmental	  agency,	  then	  called	  the	  State	  Sanitary	  Authority	  (SSA),	  considered	  bringing	  the	  issue	  before	  Oregon’s	  State	  Legislature,	  but	  one	  official	  worried,	  “There	  are	  several	  sacred	  cows	  in	  the	  state	  Legislature…	  Agriculture	  is	  one:	  it	  enjoys	  statutory	  exception”	  (Schainck	  1964,	  p.1).	  	  When	  the	  Oregon	  legislature	  in	  1966	  considered	  a	  bill	  requiring	  growers	  to	  seek	  permits	  before	  igniting	  their	  fields,	  it	  confirmed	  that	  agriculture	  was	  the	  third	  rail	  of	  Oregon	  politics	  when	  the	  bill	  died	  due	  to	  opposition	  from	  the	  Oregon	  Farm	  Bureau	  and	  State	  Senator	  Walter	  Leth	  (R-­‐Salem),	  who	  was	  a	  grass	  seed	  farmer	  (Forrester	  1966).	  	  	  	  After	  Tom	  McCall	  (R-­‐OR)	  was	  elected	  governor,	  however,	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  growers	  could	  no	  longer	  depend	  on	  their	  loosely	  coordinated	  way	  of	  protecting	  their	  interests	  before	  the	  legislature.	  	  Prior	  to	  becoming	  governor,	  McCall	  was	  a	  journalist	  and	  became	  famous	  for	  producing	  a	  television	  documentary	  that	  exposed	  deteriorating	  water	  quality	  in	  the	  Willamette	  River	  (Robbins	  2002).	  	  After	  his	  election,	  McCall	  made	  environmental	  cleanup	  his	  highest	  priority	  and	  appeared	  before	  a	  Senate	  Committee	  to	  announce	  that,	  	  [The	  Legislature]	  has	  the	  opportunity	  of	  going	  down	  in	  history	  as	  the	  one	  that	  did	  more	  to	  promote	  high	  air	  and	  water	  quality	  standards	  than	  all	  the	  preceding	  legislatures	  in	  the	  annals	  of	  Oregon	  state	  government	  (Abell	  1967,	  p.1).	  	  	  	  During	  the	  1969	  legislative	  session,	  McCall	  submitted	  a	  bill	  to	  the	  legislature	  that	  gave	  the	  renamed	  SSA,	  now	  called	  the	  Department	  of	  Environmental	  Quality	  (DEQ),	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authority	  to	  regulate	  field	  burning	  (Lynch	  1969;	  N.A.	  1969a),	  a	  bill	  that	  overwhelmingly	  passed	  (N.A.	  1969b).1	  	  Although	  the	  agency	  was	  designed	  to	  protect	  public	  health	  and	  the	  environment,	  the	  DEQ’s	  authority	  to	  regulate	  field	  burning	  proved	  insufficient	  for	  improving	  air	  quality	  in	  the	  Willamette	  Valley.	  	  During	  the	  summer	  of	  1969	  air	  quality	  became	  so	  poor	  that	  Governor	  McCall	  declared	  an	  emergency	  ban	  on	  field	  burning	  and	  promised	  to	  end	  future	  air	  emergencies:	  	  	  	  Residents	  of	  the	  Willamette	  Valley	  are	  being	  subjected	  to	  air	  pollution	  caused	  by	  agricultural	  field	  burning	  that	  is	  completely	  intolerable…I	  have	  checked	  with	  the	  Department	  of	  Environmental	  Quality	  Director…and	  I	  know	  every	  possible	  action	  under	  existing	  laws	  is	  being	  taken	  to	  cope	  with	  what	  in	  recent	  days	  has	  become	  an	  emergency…It	  is	  ridiculous	  that	  while	  we	  are	  phasing	  out	  wigwam	  burners	  and	  other	  polluting	  industrial	  practices	  we	  allow	  ourselves	  to	  be	  subjected	  to	  this	  air	  pollution	  which	  shocks	  our	  sensibilities	  and	  is	  a	  threat	  to	  health	  and	  safety.	  	  A	  complete	  ban	  on	  agricultural	  field	  burning	  is	  a	  must	  (N.A.	  1969c,	  p.1).	  	  During	  the	  next	  legislative	  session,	  McCall	  instructed	  Oregon	  Senate	  leaders	  to	  pass	  legislation	  banning	  the	  practice	  of	  field	  burning	  (Willis	  1971a;	  N.A.	  1971).	  	  In	  response,	  seed	  growers	  formed	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  to	  mobilize	  farmers	  (Willis	  1971b),	  but	  their	  efforts	  came	  too	  late	  to	  overcome	  the	  combination	  of	  Governor	  McCall’s	  desire	  to	  cement	  his	  environmental	  legacy	  and	  the	  City	  of	  Eugene’s	  decades-­‐long	  effort	  to	  end	  the	  practice	  of	  field	  burning.	  	  The	  chief	  sponsor	  of	  the	  bill,	  Rep.	  LeRoy	  Owens	  (D-­‐Eugene),	  described	  it	  as,	  …a	  means	  to	  put	  the	  responsibility	  of	  polluting	  on	  the	  polluters…	  The	  important	  thing	  is	  that	  the	  philosophy	  of	  polluters	  paying	  for	  the	  right	  to	  pollute	  is	  inherent	  in	  this	  bill	  (Willis	  1971b).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  legislation	  also	  gave	  the	  DEQ	  authority	  to	  issue	  permits	  that	  could	  be	  distributed	  by	  local	  fire	  districts	  for	  the	  burning	  of	  crop	  residue.	  	  In	  1991,	  this	  program	  became	  the	  Oregon	  Department	  of	  Agriculture’s	  (ODA)	  Smoke	  Management	  Program,	  a	  program	  that	  required	  growers	  to	  register	  acres	  and	  secure	  permits	  prior	  to	  burning	  on	  days	  when	  ODA	  announced	  that	  weather	  conditions	  were	  suitable	  for	  adequate	  smoke	  dispersion.	  	  For	  more	  information	  about	  this	  program,	  see:	  http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/pages/rules/oars_600/oar_603/603_077.html	  (last	  acccessed	  02/17/2016)	  	  	  
	   14	  
During	  the	  bill’s	  hearings,	  Eugene’s	  City	  Manager,	  Hugh	  McKinley	  testified	  that	  “[w]e	  have	  no	  ill	  will	  towards	  the	  grass	  seed	  industry…but	  we	  are	  concerned	  about	  clean	  air”	  (Willis	  1971b),	  and	  the	  legislature	  agreed,	  passing	  a	  bill	  that	  eliminated	  field	  burning	  by	  1975	  (Willis	  1971c;	  Eugene	  Register-­‐Guard	  1971;	  Willis	  1971d).	  	  The	  looming	  1975	  deadline	  meant	  that	  growers	  had	  the	  benefit	  of	  time	  to	  mobilize	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  new	  legislative	  framework	  and	  they	  did	  so	  through	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  which,	  due	  to	  its	  funding	  source	  of	  per-­‐acre	  burning	  fees,	  was	  motivated	  by	  a	  strong	  incentive	  for	  its	  leaders	  to	  scale	  back	  legislation	  that	  limited	  the	  number	  of	  acres	  growers	  could	  burn.	  	  Protecting	  the	  grass	  seed	  industry	  meant	  that	  the	  organization’s	  leaders	  needed	  to	  choose	  where	  to	  pursue	  its	  policy	  goals	  and	  their	  choices	  demonstrate	  that	  they	  were	  guided	  into	  venues	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  resources,	  their	  opponents’	  resources,	  and	  their	  degree	  of	  access	  to	  the	  venues	  that	  were	  available	  in	  Oregon’s	  political	  system.	  	  	  After	  experiencing	  a	  defeat	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  legislative	  branch,	  it	  only	  seemed	  logical	  for	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  to	  look	  elsewhere	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  its	  policy	  goals	  and	  so	  perhaps	  either	  agencies	  or	  courts	  provided	  the	  next	  best	  option	  for	  policy	  change.	  Growers	  knew	  that,	  even	  though	  the	  DEQ	  was	  responsible	  for	  overseeing	  implementation	  of	  the	  legislative	  phase-­‐out,	  and	  their	  opponents	  had	  not	  yet	  cultivated	  strong	  relationships	  with	  the	  revamped	  agency,	  it	  was	  a	  relatively	  easy	  decision	  not	  to	  try	  convincing	  a	  public	  health	  agency	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  ban	  was	  too	  economically	  burdensome	  for	  the	  industry.	  	  	  	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  courts,	  growers	  lacked	  a	  convincing	  legal	  argument	  to	  persuade	  state	  judges,	  or	  any	  court	  for	  that	  matter,	  that	  the	  legislature	  had	  acted	  contrary	  to	  its	  constitutional	  authority	  to	  exercise	  police	  powers	  in	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support	  of	  public	  health.	  	  Even	  if	  their	  opponents	  had	  no	  clear-­‐cut	  advantage	  in	  the	  legal	  arena,	  the	  choice	  to	  avoid	  a	  judicial	  strategy	  was	  also	  relatively	  easy	  because	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  legal	  argument	  meant	  that	  growers	  had	  insufficient	  legal	  resources,	  no	  accessibility,	  and	  no	  way	  of	  effectively	  manipulating	  the	  legal	  framing	  of	  the	  conflict	  in	  ways	  that	  could	  convince	  state	  and	  federal	  courts	  to	  overturn	  the	  ban	  (see	  Table	  2).	  	  	   Three	  critical	  developments	  made	  the	  legislature	  the	  easiest	  and	  best	  option	  for	  growers	  to	  reverse	  the	  burn	  ban	  even	  though	  the	  group	  initially	  suffered	  defeat	  before	  the	  legislature.	  	  First,	  as	  the	  ban	  grew	  nearer,	  so	  did	  the	  end	  of	  Tom	  McCall’s	  second	  term	  as	  Oregon’s	  governor,	  which	  ended	  in	  1975	  when	  Democratic	  Governor	  Robert	  Straub,	  a	  moderate	  on	  environmental	  issues,	  replaced	  him.	  	  Second,	  the	  Eugene	  City	  Council	  shifted	  its	  attention	  to	  other	  political	  issues,	  allowing	  growers	  to	  develop	  a	  legislative	  strategy	  without	  interference	  from	  their	  adversaries.	  	  With	  no	  single-­‐issue	  group	  in	  existence	  to	  monitor	  the	  legislature’s	  activities,	  the	  legislative	  venue	  became	  increasingly	  accessible	  to	  growers	  due	  to	  Eugene’s	  attention	  to	  other	  matters.	  	  Finally,	  growers	  capitalized	  on	  the	  City	  of	  Eugene’s	  abandonment	  of	  the	  legislature	  by	  hiring	  an	  experienced	  lobbyist	  named	  Dave	  Nelson	  to	  lead	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council.	  	  One	  legislator	  described	  Nelson	  as,	  …the	  best	  lobbyist	  they	  could	  get.	  	  [He]	  was	  their	  paid	  person.	  	  But	  they	  hired	  the	  best	  they	  could	  get	  for	  lobbying	  and	  poured	  money	  into	  it.	  	  Their	  argument,	  of	  course,	  was	  if	  field	  burning	  dies,	  we	  die.	  	  And	  we	  just	  can’t	  go	  there.	  	  We	  can’t	  live	  with	  it	  [a	  ban]	  (Personal	  Interview,	  Former	  State	  Legislator).	  	  Growers	  learned	  from	  past	  failures	  that	  success	  required	  developing	  the	  political	  support	  and	  resources	  necessary	  in	  the	  legislature	  for	  weakening	  state	  legislation	  aimed	  at	  phasing	  out	  the	  practice	  of	  field	  burning.	  Once	  hired,	  Nelson	  wasted	  no	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time	  overseeing	  a	  large-­‐scale	  lobbying	  campaign	  to	  convince	  state	  legislators	  that	  regulating	  field	  burning	  was	  harmful	  to	  the	  grass	  seed	  industry.	  	  He	  also	  formed	  a	  political	  action	  committee	  that	  was	  designed	  to	  elect	  legislators	  who	  were	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  industry.	  	  This,	  in	  effect,	  allowed	  growers	  to	  develop	  stronger	  resources	  in	  the	  legislature	  relative	  to	  opponents	  of	  field	  burning	  whose	  resources	  diminished	  when	  they	  shifted	  their	  attention	  elsewhere	  (see	  Table	  2).	  	  The	  strategy	  began	  paying	  off.	  	  One	  industry	  advocate	  remembered	  that	  “the	  legislature	  was	  fairly	  friendly”	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  efforts	  “to	  get	  …	  legislators	  elected	  who	  were	  more	  favorable	  to	  agriculture	  and	  to	  the	  grass	  seed	  industry”	  (Personal	  Interview,	  Agricultural	  Stakeholder).	  Table	  2	  Here	  The	  legislature	  also	  became	  more	  receptive,	  and	  open,	  to	  an	  economic	  framing	  of	  the	  field	  burning	  conflict	  than	  it	  had	  been	  in	  the	  past	  (see	  Table	  2).	  	  This	  was	  due,	  in	  part,	  to	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  efforts	  to	  educate	  legislators	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  ban	  on	  the	  growing	  community.	  	  The	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  arranged	  for	  farmers	  to	  meet	  with	  legislators	  in	  Oregon’s	  capital	  city	  of	  Salem	  so	  that	  the	  battle	  over	  field	  burning	  regulations	  was	  reinforced	  as	  an	  economic	  issue	  that	  affected	  growers’	  bottom	  line:	  	  	  …	  we	  had	  a	  cadre	  of	  about	  ten	  or	  fifteen	  farmers,	  maybe	  twenty,	  who	  would	  come	  up	  every	  day	  during	  the	  legislative	  session	  and	  we	  would	  lobby	  the	  senate	  and	  the	  house	  and	  everybody	  had	  their	  contacts	  they	  were	  assigned	  to.	  	  That	  morning	  we	  would	  give	  out	  their	  assignments	  and	  then	  we	  had	  their	  talking	  points,	  their…firsthand	  understandings	  of	  the	  impact	  [of	  a	  burning	  ban]	  on	  their	  farm	  (Personal	  Interview,	  Agricultural	  Stakeholder).	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It	  also	  became	  clearer	  that	  the	  legislature	  was	  receptive	  to	  the	  economic	  framing	  of	  the	  issue	  that	  was	  being	  advanced	  by	  growers	  mobilized	  by	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council.	  	  One	  advocate	  of	  the	  seed	  industry	  remembered:	  At	  that	  time,	  business	  impacts	  were	  much	  more	  important	  than	  some	  of	  them	  were	  today.	  [Today]	  they	  say	  to	  hell	  with	  the	  profitability.	  	  Profit’s	  a	  bad	  word,	  we’re	  gonna	  [regulate]	  anyway.	  	  Then	  [in	  1975]	  there	  was	  a	  greater	  sensitivity	  to	  economic	  impact	  and	  the	  seed	  industry…We’d	  work	  the	  legislature;	  we	  could	  generally	  beat	  Eugene	  in	  the	  Oregon	  legislature.	  (Personal	  Interview,	  Agricultural	  Stakeholder).	  	  As	  the	  1975	  deadline	  neared,	  growers	  learned	  that	  their	  efforts	  of	  “working”	  the	  legislature	  and	  advancing	  an	  economic	  framing	  of	  the	  field	  burning	  conflict	  could	  be	  combined	  with	  a	  strategy	  to	  convince	  state	  legislators	  that	  it	  was	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  before	  engineers	  developed	  a	  mobile	  field	  burning	  device	  that	  minimized	  smoke	  emissions	  by	  burning	  crop	  residue	  at	  high	  temperatures	  (Harvey	  1975).	  	  The	  technical	  solution	  of	  a	  mobile	  field	  burning	  device,	  perennially	  on	  the	  cusp	  of	  an	  engineering	  breakthrough,	  became	  a	  rather	  convenient	  justification	  for	  legislators	  to	  wait	  until	  future	  legislative	  sessions	  to	  act	  on	  the	  field	  burning	  issue.	  	  The	  passage	  of	  time	  from	  1971	  to	  1974	  also	  meant	  that	  the	  ardent	  environmentalists	  who	  dominated	  the	  legislature	  and	  governor’s	  office	  during	  the	  McCall	  Administration	  were	  no	  longer	  in	  control	  of	  the	  machinery	  of	  government.	  Newly	  elected	  Governor	  Bob	  Straub	  (D-­‐OR)	  was	  sympathetic	  toward	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  claim	  that	  the	  mobile	  field	  burning	  device	  held	  promise	  and	  proposed	  an	  extension	  that	  allowed	  farmers	  to	  burn	  up	  to	  235,000	  acres	  of	  their	  fields,	  but	  to	  draw	  that	  amount	  down	  to	  150,000	  acres	  the	  following	  year	  (N.A.	  1975a;	  N.A.	  1975b;	  Willis	  1975a,	  p.	  1).	  	  Even	  though	  Governor	  Straub’s	  plan	  to	  grant	  growers	  an	  extension	  was	  strongly	  opposed	  by	  the	  Sierra	  Club,	  physicians,	  and	  members	  of	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Eugene’s	  City	  Council	  (Willis	  1975b),	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  years-­‐long	  effort	  to	  generate	  greater	  political	  support	  in	  the	  legislature	  culminated	  in	  a	  new	  plan	  that	  allowed	  growers	  to	  burn	  235,000	  acres	  in	  1975,	  195,000	  acres	  in	  1976,	  95,000	  acres	  in	  1977,	  and	  50,000	  acres	  in	  1978.	  	  This	  agreement	  to	  draw	  down	  the	  amount	  of	  acreage	  to	  be	  burned	  over	  a	  number	  of	  years	  would	  have	  the	  critical	  effect	  of	  a)	  keeping	  the	  field	  burning	  issue	  a	  legislative	  matter,	  and	  b)	  allowing	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  to	  wait	  until	  the	  right	  political	  conditions	  were	  in	  place	  to	  weaken	  these	  regulations	  even	  more.	  	  	  
B.	  	  Vested	  Interests,	  Policy	  Entrenchment,	  and	  Institutional	  Inertia	  The	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  wasted	  no	  time	  insulating	  its	  policy	  success	  from	  reversal	  after	  passing	  the	  legislation,	  raising	  $77,350	  to	  continue	  funding	  its	  strategy	  of	  legislative	  advocacy	  (Lynch	  1976a).	  	  The	  Seed	  Council	  used	  this	  money	  to	  lobby	  for	  additional	  reversals	  of	  the	  ban,	  which,	  later,	  allowed	  it	  to	  generate	  more	  revenue	  from	  growers	  as	  more	  acreage	  was	  registered	  and	  burned.	  	  In	  the	  five	  years	  following	  the	  Oregon	  Legislature’s	  ban,	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  had	  grown	  into	  “a	  very	  well	  financed,	  powerful	  political	  organization”	  that	  came	  to	  dominate	  the	  legislature	  (Lynch	  1976b,	  p.	  7).	  One	  former	  legislator	  remembered	  that,	  The	  grass	  seed	  growers	  cried	  and	  moaned	  and	  whined	  and	  put	  together	  a	  huge	  ag	  industry	  coalition	  and	  got	  the	  ban	  turned	  into	  a	  phase-­‐down	  and	  then	  the	  phase-­‐down	  turned	  into	  a	  250,000	  acre	  cap…The	  1971	  ban	  was	  led	  by	  Lane	  County	  and	  Benton	  County	  Legislators,	  the	  cities	  of	  Corvallis	  and	  Eugene,	  but	  it	  was	  something	  that	  was	  dealt	  with	  in	  1971	  as	  a	  pollution	  control	  measure.	  	  It	  surprised	  the	  hell	  out	  of	  the	  farmers	  and	  they	  of	  course	  ramped	  up	  and	  turned	  right	  around	  and	  the	  ban	  became	  a	  quarter	  of	  a	  million	  acres	  (Personal	  Interview,	  Former	  State	  Legislature).	  	  The	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  continued	  its	  momentum	  and	  in	  the	  next	  legislative	  session	  sought	  permission	  to	  burn	  the	  original	  235,000	  acres	  (Smith	  1977).	  Even	  though	  this	  proposal	  was	  altered	  to	  give	  growers	  permission	  to	  burn	  190,000	  acres	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that	  year	  (nearly	  100,000	  acres	  more	  than	  the	  95,000	  acres	  that	  the	  1975	  legislation	  allotted),	  the	  legislature’s	  passage	  of	  it	  clearly	  demonstrated	  how	  effective	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  became	  at	  executing	  its	  strategy	  of	  weakening	  field	  burning	  regulations.	  	  When	  seed	  industry	  advocate	  Vic	  Atiyeh	  (R-­‐OR)	  became	  Oregon’s	  newly	  elected	  Governor	  in	  1978,	  all	  of	  the	  political	  conditions	  were	  in	  place	  for	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  to	  try	  eliminating	  all	  limits	  on	  field	  burning	  (Smith	  1979).	  	  The	  legislature	  agreed	  and	  opponents	  of	  field	  burning	  had	  nowhere	  to	  turn	  but	  the	  courts,	  but	  even	  that	  strategy	  fell	  short	  of	  reversing	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  policy	  achievements	  (N.A.	  1979).	  	  With	  administrative	  agencies	  lacking	  power	  to	  regulate	  the	  practice	  of	  field	  burning,	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  protected	  its	  policy	  victories	  from	  reversal	  by	  continuing	  to	  execute	  a	  legislative	  strategy,	  thus	  generating	  the	  institutional	  inertia	  and	  policy	  stability	  that	  frustrated	  opponents	  of	  field	  burning.	  	  The	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  efforts	  to	  insulate	  its	  policy	  victories	  from	  reversal	  by	  instituting	  a	  blocking	  strategy	  was	  made	  easier	  by	  the	  Oregon	  legislature’s	  institutional	  characteristics.	  The	  seed	  council	  was	  especially	  successful	  in	  exploiting	  the	  institutional	  rules	  of	  the	  legislative	  game	  in	  ways	  that	  kept	  other	  groups	  from	  acting	  on	  field	  burning	  legislatively.	  	  These	  institutional	  characteristics	  involved	  a	  multitude	  of	  veto	  points	  that	  allowed	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  to	  keep	  legislation	  from	  being	  acted	  on	  and,	  even	  in	  the	  event	  that	  legislation	  was	  proposed,	  the	  House	  and	  Senate	  committees	  on	  agriculture	  always	  provided	  a	  reliable	  blocking	  point.	  	  A	  blocking	  strategy	  was	  made	  even	  easier	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  legislative	  business	  occurred	  in	  Oregon	  bi-­‐annually.	  	  One	  lobbyist	  explained	  it	  this	  way:	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It’s	  easier	  [to	  keep	  issues	  off	  the	  agenda],	  not	  because	  of	  the	  length	  of	  time,	  but	  you	  have	  a	  more	  compressed	  time	  to	  deal	  with	  issues.	  	  So	  you	  got	  basically	  one	  shot	  to	  get	  something	  up.	  	  You	  can’t	  come	  back	  and	  back	  and	  back	  unless	  you’re	  cutting	  deals	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session	  and	  that’s	  where	  the	  so-­‐called	  end	  game	  takes	  place.	  	  As	  you	  come	  down	  to	  the	  end	  game,	  the	  speaker	  has	  a	  list	  of	  things,	  the	  majority	  leader	  has	  a	  list	  of	  things,	  and	  they	  go	  to	  the	  members	  and	  say,	  “If	  you	  want	  your	  community	  college	  funding	  you’re	  going	  to	  vote	  for	  this	  field	  burning	  bill.”	  	  That’s	  where	  the	  line	  up	  really	  takes	  place	  (Personal	  Interview,	  Agricultural	  Stakeholder).	  	  	  Keeping	  legislation	  from	  reaching	  the	  agenda	  could	  only	  be	  achieved	  through	  sustained	  advocacy	  efforts	  that	  were	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  collection	  of	  mandatory	  per-­‐acre	  burning	  fees	  raised	  from	  grass	  growers.	  	  The	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  used	  these	  revenue	  sources	  to	  bankroll	  lobbying	  and	  public	  relations	  activities	  that	  cost	  an	  average	  of	  $25,000	  per	  year	  (Ley	  2011).	  	  A	  typical	  year	  of	  advocating	  on	  behalf	  of	  grass	  growers	  was	  described	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  	  ….	  three	  of	  us	  were	  [lobbying]	  	  We	  started	  the	  session	  out	  by	  visiting…the	  whole	  ninety	  Oregon	  legislators	  -­‐	  we	  may	  have	  missed	  one	  or	  two,	  but	  I	  don’t	  think	  so.	  	  Then	  we	  started	  with	  an	  educational	  packet	  for	  them	  [the	  legislators],	  sat	  down	  for	  about	  a	  half-­‐hour	  meeting	  with	  each	  and	  every	  one	  of	  them	  and	  just	  [tried]	  to	  update	  them	  on…the	  background,	  the	  history,	  where	  we	  were	  as	  an	  industry,	  what	  we’re	  doing,	  and	  that	  took	  us	  probably	  through	  first	  of	  March.	  	  We	  spent	  January	  and	  February	  doing	  that	  background	  educational	  work.	  	  After	  that,	  there	  was	  a	  hearing	  held	  on	  a	  House	  Bill…so	  obviously	  we	  prepared	  testimony	  for	  that,	  the	  whole	  time	  encouraging	  farmers	  to	  come	  to	  the	  capitol.	  	  We	  were	  somewhat	  successful.	  	  We	  had	  a	  few	  farmers	  make	  multiple	  trips	  and	  quite	  a	  few	  farmers	  make	  single	  trips	  to	  talk	  with	  their	  own	  legislators.	  	  We	  worked	  with	  them,	  preparing	  them	  for	  those	  meetings,	  [we]	  attended	  some,	  didn’t	  attend	  others…all	  the	  while	  throughout	  that,	  during	  legislative	  meetings	  [we	  were]	  talking	  about	  the	  issue,	  vote	  counting,	  trying	  to	  line	  up	  votes…down	  to	  the	  11th	  hour	  to	  the	  last	  day	  when	  the	  bill	  finally	  passed	  the	  Senate	  and	  the	  House.	  	  That	  kind	  of	  sums	  it	  up	  (Personal	  Interview,	  Agricultural	  Stakeholder).	  	  By	  focusing	  on	  maintaining	  relationships	  with	  legislators	  and	  using	  the	  multiple	  veto	  points	  of	  a	  legislature	  that	  met	  only	  bi-­‐annually,	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  successfully	  insulated	  its	  policy	  achievements	  from	  reversal,	  created	  institutional	  inertia	  by	  supporting	  legislatively-­‐prescribed	  burning	  limits	  versus	  delegating	  the	  decisions	  to	  an	  agency,	  and	  created	  a	  decade	  of	  policy	  stability	  until	  1988.	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C.	  Focusing	  Events,	  Vested	  Interests,	  and	  Combating	  the	  Forces	  of	  
Resilience.	  The	  policy	  status	  quo	  was	  disrupted	  when	  poor	  visibility	  from	  grass	  smoke	  caused	  a	  deadly	  car	  pileup	  leaving	  seven	  motorists	  dead	  and	  countless	  others	  demanding	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  accident.	  	  Not	  long	  after	  the	  accident,	  Governor	  Neil	  Goldschmidt	  (D-­‐OR)	  declared	  a	  stop	  to	  burning	  until	  the	  legislature	  decided	  how	  best	  to	  respond.	  	  One	  former	  legislator	  recalled,	  	  The	  catalyst	  of	  course	  [for	  considering	  new	  legislation]	  was	  the	  1988	  accident	  because	  it	  was	  so	  horrendous	  –	  it	  happened	  right	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  valley	  on	  interstate	  5	  killing	  children	  and	  burning	  children	  to	  death,	  causing	  horracious	  amounts	  of	  injuries	  to	  others.	  	  The	  whole	  process	  turned	  the	  corner	  (Personal	  Interview,	  Former	  State	  Legislator).	  	  	  	  A	  small	  group	  of	  residents	  formed	  Oregonians	  Against	  Field	  Burning	  (AP	  1988),	  a	  group	  vowing	  to	  end	  field	  burning	  by	  ballot	  measure	  if	  it	  was	  unsuccessful	  at	  ending	  it	  legislatively	  (AP	  1989).	  	  In	  response	  to	  growing	  public	  intolerance	  of	  grass	  smoke,	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  instituted	  an	  aggressive	  public	  relations	  campaign	  advertising	  the	  seed	  industry’s	  critical	  role	  in	  Oregon’s	  economy	  and	  its	  willingness	  to	  compromise	  with	  advocates	  of	  stricter	  controls	  (AP	  1988;	  Detzel	  1989a).	  	  The	  public	  relations	  strategy	  did	  not	  deter	  Democratic	  State	  Senator	  Grattan	  Kerans	  (D-­‐Eugene)	  from	  promising	  to	  eliminate	  field	  burning	  through	  legislation	  (Detzel	  1989b).	  	  He	  was	  a	  political	  entrepreneur	  who	  gave	  Oregonians	  Against	  Field	  Burning	  the	  type	  of	  political	  capital	  that	  it	  needed	  to	  get	  legislation	  passed.	  	  He	  accused	  the	  grass	  seed	  industry	  of	  using	  “the	  air	  as	  an	  open	  sewer”	  and	  framed	  the	  conflict	  as	  a	  public	  health	  hazard	  that	  justified	  a	  ban	  on	  field	  burning	  (Mapes	  1989).	  	  When	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  responded	  with	  an	  advertising	  campaign	  claiming	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that	  a	  ban	  would	  cost	  $750	  million	  and	  the	  disappearance	  of	  10,000	  jobs,	  Kerans	  mocked	  the	  public	  relations	  strategy	  by	  saying,	  	  I	  see	  we’re	  now	  up	  to	  $750	  million.	  	  Eventually,	  this	  industry	  will	  be	  responsible	  for	  all	  jobs,	  and	  the	  state	  of	  Western	  Civilization	  will	  hinge	  upon	  its	  continued	  [existence]…the	  land	  will	  stand	  fallow,	  the	  homes	  will	  be	  windowless,	  the	  varmints	  will	  be	  using	  them	  as	  their	  nests.	  	  The	  towns	  will	  collapse,	  the	  grass	  will	  grow	  in	  the	  streets.	  	  That’s	  the	  typical	  response:	  An	  apocalypse	  that	  will	  goad	  even	  me	  to	  send	  voluntary	  contributions	  to	  their	  public-­‐relations	  campaign.	  The	  industry	  in	  its	  utter	  arrogance	  needs	  to	  realize	  I	  didn’t	  arrive	  at	  this	  Legislature	  off	  the	  back	  of	  a	  turnip	  truck	  this	  morning…	  The	  day	  of	  reckoning	  is	  coming	  in	  Oregon.	  	  I	  won’t	  put	  out	  a	  sucker	  bill	  as	  an	  initiative	  for	  them	  to	  pound	  on.	  	  I	  won’t	  make	  a	  hobby	  of	  this	  industry.	  	  I	  will	  commit	  every	  day	  of	  my	  life	  to	  this	  issue,	  and	  I	  pledge	  you,	  I	  am	  not	  going	  to	  lose	  this	  fight	  (Duins	  1989).	  	  Kerans’s	  promises	  culminated	  in	  the	  drafting	  of	  numerous	  bills	  that	  drew	  hundreds	  of	  onlookers	  during	  committee	  hearings,	  including	  one	  that	  attracted	  500	  spectators	  (Boyd	  1989).	  	  Although	  the	  car	  accident	  provided	  the	  tragic	  spectacle	  needed	  to	  overcome	  the	  legislative	  inertia	  that	  opponents	  of	  field	  burning	  experienced	  in	  Oregon,	  the	  long-­‐term	  legislative	  strategy	  implemented	  by	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  and	  its	  decades-­‐long	  experience	  blocking	  attempts	  to	  regulate	  the	  practice	  were	  too	  much	  for	  the	  coalition	  trying	  to	  stop	  field	  burning.	  	  Concerned	  that	  legislation	  went	  “too	  far	  too	  fast,”	  (Detzel	  1989c,	  1989d),	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  drew	  upon	  its	  institutional	  knowledge	  of	  the	  legislative	  game	  to	  block	  a	  bill	  that	  restricted	  acres	  burned	  from	  250,000	  acres	  to	  150,000	  acres	  (N.A.	  1989).	  	  After	  watching	  the	  bill	  die	  in	  the	  House,	  and	  knowing	  that	  its	  resources	  were	  no	  match	  for	  the	  legislative	  resources	  possessed	  by	  growers,	  Oregonians	  Against	  Field	  Burning	  spent	  $10,000	  collecting	  15,000	  petitions	  and	  launched	  a	  short-­‐lived	  ballot	  initiative	  campaign	  that	  was	  defeated	  when	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  petitioned	  the	  Oregon	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  change	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  ballot	  measure’s	  title	  (USA	  Today	  1989).	  	  The	  timing	  of	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the	  lawsuit	  left	  Oregonians	  Against	  Field	  Burning	  with	  very	  little	  time	  to	  finish	  collecting	  signatures	  under	  the	  ballot	  measure’s	  rewritten	  title	  (Detzel	  1989c;	  Mapes	  1990).	  	  One	  seed	  industry	  advocate	  explained	  the	  strategy	  behind	  changing	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  ballot	  measure:	  Yeah,	  we	  said	  if	  we	  can	  get	  this	  [the	  ballot	  measure	  title]	  changed	  –	  one	  word	  is	  all	  we	  need	  –	  and	  that’s	  gonna	  set	  them	  back	  and	  really	  compress	  their	  period	  of	  time	  that	  they	  have	  to	  get	  the	  signatures.	  	  At	  the	  time	  what	  we	  were	  doing	  was	  politics,	  technical	  and	  legal.	  	  You	  have	  to	  be	  as	  smart	  as	  the	  enemy	  or	  smarter	  than	  the	  enemy	  in	  all	  three	  of	  those	  areas	  (Personal	  Interview,	  Agricultural	  Stakeholder).	  	  Even	  though	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  succeeded	  in	  keeping	  the	  issue	  of	  field	  burning	  from	  being	  addressed	  through	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  process,	  there	  still	  remained	  concerns	  from	  members	  of	  the	  organization	  about	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  Oregonians	  Against	  Field	  Burning	  collected	  15,000	  signatures	  to	  place	  the	  issue	  on	  the	  November	  ballot.	  	  When	  Republicans	  seized	  control	  of	  the	  State	  House	  that	  November	  growers	  saw	  the	  arrival	  of	  Republican	  leadership	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  negotiate	  a	  new	  legislative	  framework	  they	  could	  live	  under	  (Walth	  1991).	  	  One	  industry	  lobbyist	  explained	  how	  growers	  came	  to	  this	  conclusion:	  Coming	  forward	  from	  the	  ’88	  accident,	  the	  fight	  went	  out	  of	  the	  farmers….[W]e	  can’t	  raise	  enough	  money	  to	  fend	  [regulation]	  off	  now	  because	  all	  you	  have	  to	  do	  is	  show	  pictures	  of	  the	  wreck	  and	  its	  over…	  It	  gave	  us	  a	  lot	  more	  bargaining	  power	  to	  come	  up	  with	  something	  we	  could	  survive	  [when	  Republicans	  took	  control	  of	  the	  Legislature	  in	  1991].	  	  We	  knew	  that	  there	  was	  going	  to	  be	  very	  restrictive	  legislation	  and	  so	  get	  your	  best	  deal	  and	  recognize	  that’s	  the	  times	  you’re	  living	  in	  (Personal	  Interview,	  Agricultural	  Stakeholder).	  	  	  	  Despite	  its	  success	  avoiding	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  challenge,	  the	  high	  financial	  cost	  of	  successfully	  waging	  another	  campaign	  weighed	  heavily	  on	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  members.	  	  According	  to	  one	  member,	  We	  polled	  it	  [support	  for	  growers	  facing	  a	  ballot	  initiative	  campaign],	  and	  we	  had	  polled	  it	  several	  times.	  	  We	  polled	  it	  back	  in	  the	  ‘70s,	  we	  polled	  it	  in	  the	  ‘90s,	  and	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basically	  we	  had	  75	  percent	  support	  for	  the	  industry.	  	  What	  we	  weren’t	  sure	  of	  was	  could	  we	  fund	  the	  campaign?..[W]e	  were	  predicting	  [a	  ballot	  initiative	  campaign	  would	  cost]	  somewhere	  between	  $1	  million	  and	  $1.5	  million	  to	  really	  put	  on	  a	  winning	  campaign.	  	  That’s	  a	  lot	  to	  raise	  (Personal	  Interview,	  Agricultural	  Stakeholder).	  	  Uncertain	  about	  its	  prospects	  of	  funding	  and	  winning	  a	  ballot	  measure	  campaign,	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  adopted	  the	  same	  legislative	  strategy	  that	  had	  worked	  so	  well	  for	  it	  in	  the	  past.	  	  This	  time,	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  came	  out	  in	  support	  of	  an	  incremental,	  seven-­‐year	  field	  burning	  drawdown	  that	  allowed	  growers	  to	  burn	  65,000	  acres	  by	  1998,	  which	  was	  still	  more	  than	  the	  50,000	  acres	  that	  were	  allotted	  for	  1978	  under	  the	  previous	  legislation,	  in	  return	  for	  shifting	  regulatory	  oversight	  from	  the	  DEQ	  to	  the	  Oregon	  Department	  of	  Agriculture	  (Hill	  1991).	  	  One	  Oregon	  legislator	  described	  the	  circumstances	  leading	  to	  the	  legislation	  in	  this	  way:	  The	  farmers	  were	  pushed	  back,	  that	  didn’t	  mean	  they	  couldn’t	  win	  because	  they	  survived	  the	  1989	  session	  by	  making	  sure	  there	  was	  no	  compromise	  bill	  and	  we	  couldn’t	  negotiate	  but	  we	  got	  their	  attention	  in	  1989	  and	  90	  with	  our	  initiatives	  and	  they	  knew	  the	  game	  was	  up	  when	  the	  ‘91	  session	  began.	  	  And	  we	  got	  a	  better	  bill.	  	  We	  got	  a	  lot	  better	  bill	  in	  ‘91	  than	  what	  we	  were	  willing	  to	  do	  in	  ‘89.	  	  And	  that	  came	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  political	  pressure	  of	  collecting…75,000	  to	  80,000	  [sic]	  signatures	  on	  two	  different	  petitions	  and	  you	  put	  those	  two	  campaigns	  together	  around	  one	  [petition]	  and	  you	  keep	  this	  thing	  in	  the	  press	  for	  two	  years,	  [and	  growers]	  knew	  they	  were	  cooked.	  	  As	  I	  told	  them	  [the	  seed	  industry],	  do	  it	  with	  me	  now	  or	  do	  it	  on	  Election	  Day	  (Personal	  Interview,	  Former	  State	  Legislator).	  	  	  	  While	  the	  passage	  of	  legislation	  lowered	  the	  number	  of	  acres	  farmers	  could	  burn	  annually,	  and	  lowered	  the	  amount	  of	  acreage	  the	  organization	  could	  use	  for	  collecting	  burning	  fees	  from	  its	  members,	  the	  regulatory	  framework	  nevertheless	  gave	  growers	  another	  twenty	  years	  to	  continue	  burning	  under	  the	  oversight	  of	  a	  sympathetic	  clientele	  agency.	  	  	  Even	  though	  growers	  were	  burning	  less	  under	  this	  new	  legislative	  framework,	  the	  Willamette	  Valley	  remained	  a	  hotbed	  for	  poor	  air	  quality	  during	  the	  late	  summer	  days	  of	  August.	  	  Over	  the	  next	  decade,	  growers	  defended	  themselves	  
	   25	  
against	  public	  health	  professionals	  who	  communicated	  the	  negative	  public	  health	  effect	  of	  small	  particulate	  matter	  to	  Oregon	  policymakers.	  	  It	  was	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  until	  field	  burning	  was	  thrust	  back	  on	  to	  the	  legislative	  agenda	  when	  Democrats	  seized	  control	  of	  the	  Legislature	  and	  Governor’s	  office	  during	  the	  national	  Democratic	  wave	  of	  2006.	  	  The	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  quickly	  launched	  a	  large-­‐scale	  campaign	  in	  response	  to	  this	  shift	  in	  legislative	  control,	  causing	  one	  state	  legislator,	  Rep.	  Paul	  Holvey	  (D-­‐Eugene),	  to	  promise,	  “It	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  issue	  being	  lobbied	  the	  hardest	  around	  here	  in	  the	  first	  few	  days…They	  [the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council]	  have	  money	  to	  spend…The	  people	  who	  complain	  about	  their	  practice,	  the	  public,	  they	  don’t	  have	  lobbyists.	  	  And	  I’m	  here	  to	  represent	  them”	  (Lies	  2007a).	  	  With	  opposition	  to	  field	  burning	  rising,	  and	  a	  legislature	  narrowly	  controlled	  by	  Democrats	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  public	  health	  and	  environmental	  framing	  of	  action	  on	  field	  burning,	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  doubled-­‐down	  on	  its	  legislative	  strategy	  and	  hired	  Larry	  Campbell,	  a	  former	  speaker	  of	  the	  Oregon	  House	  who	  helped	  negotiate	  the	  field	  burning	  legislation	  that	  passed	  in	  1991,	  to	  represent	  the	  seed	  industry	  alongside	  Dave	  Nelson	  (Steves	  2007a).	  The	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  hiring	  was	  followed	  by	  Rep.	  Paul	  Holvey’s	  announcement	  that	  he	  was	  introducing	  legislation	  banning	  field	  burning	  and	  vesting	  regulatory	  oversight	  for	  its	  phase-­‐out	  in	  the	  DEQ	  (Sinks	  2007;	  Steves	  2007b).	  	  The	  bill’s	  hearings	  in	  the	  House	  Committee	  on	  Health	  Care	  drew	  120	  onlookers	  who	  watched	  supporters	  of	  the	  grass	  seed	  industry	  use	  empirical	  data	  to	  challenge	  claims	  that	  field	  burning	  caused	  respiratory	  problems	  (Dietz	  2007a;	  Lies	  2007b).	  	  The	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  Dave	  Nelson	  testified,	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DEQ’s	  emissions	  inventory	  shows	  that	  field	  burning	  contributes	  2%	  or	  less	  to	  the	  total	  particulate	  load	  in	  the	  Willamette	  Valley	  during	  the	  summer,	  and	  1%	  or	  less	  during	  the	  year…The	  largest	  sources	  of	  particulate	  are	  residential	  wood	  heating/fireplaces	  (42%	  winter	  period)	  and	  fugitive	  dust	  year	  around.	  	  DEQ	  air	  quality	  administrators	  state	  that	  the	  Willamette	  Valley	  Smoke	  Management	  program	  is	  a	  “model”	  for	  other	  states	  (underline	  original;	  Nelson	  and	  Campbell	  2007).	  	  In	  response,	  groups	  like	  the	  American	  Lung	  Association	  and	  the	  Oregon	  Medical	  Association	  drew	  support	  from	  academic	  studies	  demonstrating	  the	  negative	  public	  health	  impact	  of	  small	  particulate	  matter.	  	  One	  representative	  of	  the	  American	  Lung	  Association,	  testified,	  	  More	  than	  2,000	  peer-­‐reviewed	  studies	  on	  the	  subject	  have	  been	  published	  since	  1996,	  confirming	  the	  strong	  relationship	  between	  particle	  pollution,	  illness,	  hospitalization	  and	  premature	  death.	  	  The	  U.S.	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  recently	  completed	  a	  review	  of	  these	  studies	  and	  linked	  particle	  pollution	  to	  premature	  death	  from	  cardiovascular	  disease,	  heart	  attacks	  and	  strokes,	  as	  well	  as	  worsening	  asthma,	  [Chronic	  Obstructive	  Pulmonary	  Disease]	  COPD,	  and	  may	  cause	  lung	  cancer	  (Kaye	  2007).	  	  After	  passing	  the	  House	  Committee	  on	  Health	  Care	  (Dietz	  2007b),	  the	  bill	  was	  sent	  to	  the	  House	  Agriculture	  Committee	  where,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  controlled	  by	  Democrats,	  the	  bill	  faced	  resistance	  and	  died	  after	  fifty	  grass	  growers	  and	  agricultural	  companies	  like	  J.R.	  Simplot	  and	  Scotts	  Co.	  testified	  against	  it	  (Dietz	  2007c).	  	  The	  bill’s	  failure	  in	  committee	  did	  not	  deter	  public	  health	  advocates	  from	  mobilizing	  resources	  to	  prepare	  for	  a	  ban	  the	  next	  legislative	  session.	  	  They	  grew	  their	  coalition	  to	  include	  Eugene’s	  Western	  Environmental	  Law	  Center,	  an	  organization	  that	  threatened	  litigation	  if	  the	  legislature	  continued	  its	  history	  of	  failing	  to	  act.	  Growers	  unwittingly	  gave	  this	  coalition	  ammunition	  when	  they	  agreed	  to	  suspend	  burning	  during	  the	  2008	  Olympic	  Track	  and	  Field	  Trials	  being	  held	  in	  Eugene	  (Esteve	  2008).	  	  The	  public	  health	  community	  interpreted	  the	  seed	  industry’s	  self-­‐imposed	  moratorium	  as	  tacit	  admission	  that	  field	  burning	  was	  dangerous	  to	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public	  health,	  causing	  Democratic	  Governor	  Ted	  Kulongoski	  to	  publicly	  support	  banning	  the	  practice	  during	  the	  2009	  session	  (N.A.	  2008;	  Dietz	  2008).	  	  When	  legislative	  Democrats	  gained	  an	  even	  larger	  majority	  in	  the	  2008	  elections	  all	  of	  the	  pieces	  were	  in	  place	  for	  the	  elimination	  of	  field	  burning.	  By	  2009,	  Rep.	  Paul	  Holvey	  had	  had	  enough.	  	  It	  became	  his	  mission	  to	  overcome	  past	  obstacles	  and	  to	  pass	  a	  bill	  that	  strongly	  curtailed	  burning	  in	  Oregon’s	  Willamette	  Valley.	  	  By	  then,	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  legislative	  game	  of	  blocking	  legislation	  in	  committee	  had	  become	  all	  too	  familiar	  with	  him.	  	  Concerned	  that	  any	  House	  bill	  would	  be	  subsequently	  referred	  to,	  and	  killed,	  in	  the	  House	  Agricultural	  Committee,	  he	  asked	  Eugene	  State	  Senator	  Floyd	  Prozanski	  to	  co-­‐sponsor	  a	  bill	  on	  the	  Senate	  side	  where	  it	  cleared	  the	  Senate	  Environment	  and	  Natural	  Resources	  Committee	  and	  was	  referred	  to	  the	  Joint	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Committee	  (Personal	  Interview,	  State	  Legislator).2	  	  The	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  spent	  what	  was	  remaining	  of	  the	  legislative	  session	  seeking	  to	  block	  action	  from	  being	  taken	  there,	  but	  Eugene	  legislators	  knew	  that	  the	  organization	  would	  try	  bleeding	  out	  the	  clock.	  	  That	  explains	  why	  the	  Eugene	  delegation	  drafted	  a	  bill	  allowing	  Oregon	  voters	  to	  eliminate	  field	  burning	  through	  a	  ballot	  measure,	  which,	  according	  to	  one	  legislator,	  …was	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  shot	  across	  the	  bow	  to	  say,	  “Look,	  if	  you	  guys	  will	  not	  talk	  to	  us	  and	  if	  you	  guys	  will	  not	  work	  with	  us	  to	  try	  to	  protect	  our	  communities	  from	  the	  impacts	  of	  your	  practices	  we’re	  gonna	  take	  this	  to	  the	  ballot	  and	  run	  a	  campaign	  that	  you	  will	  have	  to	  defend	  and	  we	  are	  gonna	  use	  the	  media	  and	  the	  medical	  community	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Accordingly,	  the	  Oregon	  legislature	  requires	  that	  when	  legislation	  has	  a	  “fiscal	  impact”	  then	  it	  must	  be	  referred	  to	  the	  Joint	  House	  and	  Senate	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Committee	  after	  it	  is	  approved	  through	  a	  policy	  committee.	  	  This	  allowed	  the	  bill	  to	  circumvent	  the	  House	  Agriculture	  Committee.	  	  Because	  the	  bill	  had	  a	  “little	  bit	  of	  a	  fiscal	  impact”	  it	  went	  to	  this	  committee	  where	  there	  was	  “a	  better	  committee	  make-­‐up”	  rather	  than	  the	  House	  Agricultural	  Committee	  (Personal	  Interview,	  State	  Legislator).	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and	  potentially	  shut	  down	  your	  whole	  industry	  from	  burning	  across	  the	  state”	  (Personal	  Interview,	  State	  Legislator).	  	  	  	  After	  the	  referendum	  proposal	  was	  announced,	  the	  joint	  committee	  quickly	  acted	  on	  the	  original	  bill	  phasing	  out	  field	  burning	  in	  the	  Willamette	  Valley,	  which	  narrowly	  passed	  both	  the	  House,	  the	  Senate,	  and	  was	  signed	  into	  law	  by	  the	  Governor	  (Lies	  2009a,	  2009b).	  	  	   In	  summary,	  a	  state	  legislator,	  along	  with	  a	  highly	  mobilized	  public	  health	  community,	  overcame	  decades	  of	  grass	  seed	  industry	  dominance	  by	  beating	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  at	  its	  own	  game	  of	  legislative	  politics,	  but	  the	  magnitude	  of	  political	  change	  required	  to	  dislodge	  the	  hard	  fought	  victories	  of	  the	  grass	  seed	  industry	  makes	  this	  a	  remarkable	  and	  unique	  case	  of	  policy	  retrenchment.	  Larger	  Democratic	  majorities	  in	  both	  the	  Oregon	  House	  and	  Senate	  were	  needed	  to	  make	  the	  legislature	  accessible	  to	  this	  public	  health	  coalition.	  As	  clear	  evidence	  became	  available	  about	  the	  public	  health	  hazards	  of	  small	  particulate	  matter,	  the	  public	  health	  framing	  of	  the	  conflict	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  ignored	  and	  gained	  greater	  acceptance	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  economic	  framing	  of	  field	  burning.	  	  This	  combination	  of	  accessibility,	  a	  legislative	  policy	  entrepreneur	  with	  special	  insight	  about	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  legislative	  game,	  and	  a	  venue	  that	  was	  increasingly	  susceptible	  to	  a	  public	  health	  frame	  allowed	  the	  coalition	  to	  succeed	  in	  convincing	  lawmakers	  to	  ban	  field	  burning	  in	  Oregon’s	  Willamette	  Valley.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
VI. Discussion	  Groups	  seeking	  policy	  change	  encounter	  choices	  to	  make	  about	  which	  venue	  gives	  them	  the	  best	  chance	  of	  achieving	  their	  policy	  goals.	  	  How	  do	  they	  make	  these	  
	   29	  
choices?	  	  Previous	  research	  advances	  a	  theory	  of	  “easy	  choices”	  (Ley	  and	  Weber	  2015).	  	  While	  not	  all	  choices	  are	  easy,	  choices	  typically	  fall	  somewhere	  between	  the	  theoretical	  extremes	  of	  an	  “easy	  best	  choice”	  and	  an	  “easy	  worst	  choice.”	  	  This	  case	  study	  finds	  empirical	  support	  that,	  as	  an	  emergent	  group,	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  was	  guided	  into	  venues	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  relative	  resource	  strengths,	  its	  support	  from	  a	  newly	  elected	  governor	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  growing	  community,	  and	  the	  increasingly	  accessible	  nature	  of	  the	  legislature	  that	  supported	  the	  economic	  framing	  advanced	  by	  growers.	  	  Although	  these	  findings	  support	  the	  AVS	  Framework,	  the	  case	  study	  does	  not	  demonstrate	  that	  venue	  shopping	  always	  entails	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  learning	  about	  which	  venues	  do	  and	  do	  not	  offer	  the	  best	  opportunities	  for	  success.	  	  Instead,	  groups	  may	  achieve	  success	  in	  the	  first	  venue	  they	  choose	  and	  stick	  with	  the	  strategy.	  	  This	  became	  especially	  evident	  when	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  avoided	  overturning	  the	  burn	  ban	  in	  agencies	  and	  courts	  but,	  instead,	  opted	  to	  seek	  its	  reversal	  through	  the	  same	  legislative	  process	  that	  produced	  it.	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  finding	  empirical	  support	  for	  the	  AVS	  Framework,	  this	  case	  study	  also	  demonstrates	  how	  vested	  interests	  insulate	  their	  policy	  victories	  from	  reversal.	  	  There	  is	  no	  question	  that	  institutional	  reformers	  face	  strong	  resistance	  from	  vested	  interests	  who	  benefit	  from	  the	  policy	  status	  quo,	  but	  what	  is	  seen	  when	  we	  look	  closer	  at	  how	  these	  interests	  come	  to	  power	  and	  maintain	  their	  dominance?	  Scholars	  have	  long	  known	  that	  “vested	  interests”	  arise	  from	  the	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  policies	  “that	  reconfigure	  arrangements	  of	  power	  in	  society”	  (Mettler	  and	  SoRelle	  2014,	  p.	  152).	  	  The	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  rise	  to	  dominance	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should	  be	  a	  cautionary	  tale	  for	  environmental	  policymakers	  because	  this	  powerful	  organization’s	  origins	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  same	  statutes	  that	  were	  designed	  to	  regulate	  the	  industry.	  	  This	  case	  study	  demonstrates	  how,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Eugene	  City	  Council’s	  legislative	  achievement	  and	  abandonment	  of	  it,	  growers	  mobilized	  to	  represent	  their	  interests	  before	  the	  legislature,	  hired	  a	  lobbyist	  by	  collecting	  per-­‐acre	  burning	  fees	  to	  execute	  a	  year-­‐round	  legislative	  strategy,	  shaped	  a	  hostile	  statute	  so	  that	  it	  contained	  virtually	  no	  limits	  on	  field	  burning	  by	  1979,	  and,	  consequently,	  dominated	  this	  area	  of	  agricultural	  and	  environmental	  policy	  in	  Oregon	  for	  the	  next	  thirty	  years.	  	  While	  the	  scholarship	  surrounding	  “vested	  interests”	  is	  dominated	  by	  research	  examining	  their	  origins	  in	  distributional	  policymaking	  environments,	  this	  case	  study	  demonstrates	  how	  vested	  interests	  arise	  in	  response	  to	  regulatory	  programs	  and	  can	  succeed	  and	  maintain	  their	  organizations	  if	  their	  incentives	  to	  overturn	  or	  weaken	  policy	  are	  aligned	  with	  their	  funding	  structure.	  	  The	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  incentives	  to	  protect	  more	  acreage	  through	  legislative	  negotiation	  were	  directly	  aligned	  with	  the	  organization’s	  funding	  structure	  that	  came	  from	  per-­‐acre	  burning	  fees,	  an	  incentive	  structure	  that	  is	  uncommon	  in	  organizations	  seeking	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods,	  such	  as	  public	  health.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  so	  jealously	  guarded	  the	  acreage	  under	  its	  protection	  so	  that	  it	  could	  protect	  its	  source	  of	  organizational	  funding	  might	  explain	  how	  vested	  interests	  come	  to	  be	  so	  effective	  in	  developing	  long-­‐term	  strategies	  that	  cause	  long	  periods	  of	  policy	  stability.	  	   Another	  important	  lesson	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  case	  involves	  the	  critical	  interplay	  of	  framing,	  institutions,	  and	  macropolitical	  forces	  that	  combine	  to	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shape	  policymaking	  processes	  in	  ways	  that	  allow	  the	  forces	  of	  resilience	  to	  become	  so	  adept	  at	  protecting	  the	  status	  quo.	  Robert	  Duffy’s	  (1997)	  insights	  surrounding	  the	  nuclear	  power	  industry	  remind	  us	  that	  conflicts	  over	  environmental	  problems	  like	  field	  burning	  can	  potentially	  take	  on	  a	  number	  of	  different	  competing	  frames	  that	  are	  contingent	  on	  broader	  macropolitical	  forces.	  It	  was	  during	  the	  environmental	  decade	  of	  the	  1960s,	  for	  instance,	  that	  the	  City	  of	  Eugene	  succeeded	  in	  passing	  legislation	  by	  framing	  the	  byproducts	  of	  field	  burning	  as	  a	  nuisance	  and	  public	  health	  hazard.	  	  	  As	  the	  broader	  political	  environment	  of	  the	  1960s	  gave	  way	  to	  the	  1970s,	  however,	  a	  whole	  new	  set	  of	  values	  that	  emphasized	  economic	  freedom	  and	  new	  limits	  on	  government	  regulation	  of	  property	  began	  taking	  hold	  in	  the	  American	  West	  (Rosenbaum	  2014),	  becoming	  manifest	  in	  movements	  like	  the	  Sagebrush	  Rebellion,	  the	  property	  tax	  revolts	  of	  California,	  and	  the	  election	  of	  Western	  Governors	  like	  Gov.	  Vic	  Atiyeh	  (R-­‐OR),	  who	  became	  a	  powerful	  symbol	  of	  these	  values	  in	  Oregon	  politics.	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  Oregon’s	  state	  legislature,	  composed	  of	  part-­‐time	  citizen	  legislators	  who	  met	  only	  bi-­‐annually,	  was	  particularly	  susceptible	  to	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council’s	  economic	  framing	  of	  the	  issue,	  and	  the	  leadership	  of	  a	  full-­‐time	  Governor	  who	  represented	  	  the	  dominant	  values	  that	  were	  sweeping	  across	  the	  American	  West	  at	  the	  time.	  	  Just	  as	  the	  broader	  political	  conditions	  of	  the	  1960s	  gave	  way	  to	  the	  1970s,	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  emphasized	  environmental	  values	  sensitive	  to	  concerns	  about	  public	  health	  (Rosenbaum	  2014).	  	  	  As	  these	  environmental	  values	  became	  dominant,	  legislative	  revisions	  to	  Oregon	  field	  burning	  policy	  were	  increasingly	  likely	  when	  the	  highly	  visible	  focusing	  event,	  the	  accident	  of	  1988,	  thrust	  field	  burning	  back	  on	  to	  the	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political	  agenda.	  	  However,	  the	  case	  of	  field	  burning	  in	  Oregon	  demonstrates	  that	  institutions	  and	  the	  forces	  of	  resilience	  that	  make	  them	  resistant	  to	  change	  are	  powerful	  even	  in	  light	  of	  changing	  values	  and	  acute	  shocks	  to	  the	  political	  system.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  was	  so	  effective	  in	  fending	  off	  immediate	  change	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  tragic	  car	  pile-­‐up	  demonstrates	  the	  power	  of	  knowing	  how	  to	  manipulate	  the	  institutional	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  to	  keep	  policy	  from	  being	  acted	  upon	  and	  to	  produce	  institutional	  inertia.	  There	  are,	  furthermore,	  practical	  lessons	  that	  may	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  study	  of	  environmental	  policymaking	  in	  Oregon.	  	  Insulating	  policy	  victories	  from	  future	  reversal	  is	  a	  common	  strategy	  for	  established	  groups	  facing	  opponents	  who	  can	  challenge	  the	  policy	  status	  quo	  through	  multiple	  decision-­‐making	  venues.	  	  This	  case	  study	  not	  only	  demonstrates	  the	  rise	  to	  power	  of	  agricultural	  interests,	  but	  also	  their	  fall	  from	  grace.	  One	  practical	  insight	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  study	  of	  Oregon	  field	  burning	  is	  that	  even	  though	  political	  actors,	  such	  as	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council,	  may	  come	  to	  dominance,	  they	  can	  be	  challenged	  when	  newly	  emerged	  groups	  partner	  with	  policy	  entrepreneurs	  who	  are	  skillful	  at	  exploiting	  windows	  of	  opportunity	  (Kingdon	  1995).	  	  That	  may	  explain	  why	  the	  best	  examples	  of	  legislative	  policy	  change,	  the	  1991	  and	  2009	  drawdowns,	  occurred	  when	  state	  legislative	  policy	  entrepreneurs	  challenged	  the	  seed	  industry	  by	  successfully	  manipulating	  the	  media	  to	  keep	  policy	  windows	  open	  long	  enough	  to	  pass	  legislation	  and	  to	  threaten	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  policy	  conflict	  into	  other	  venues,	  such	  as	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  process	  (1989,	  2009)	  and	  the	  courts	  (2009).	  	  This	  provides	  empirical	  support	  not	  only	  for	  the	  ecology	  of	  policy	  games	  insight	  that	  policies	  made	  in	  one	  venue	  cause	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spillover	  externalities	  and	  shape	  policy	  in	  other	  venues	  (Lubell	  2013),	  but	  that	  the	  
threat	  or	  prospect	  of	  policy	  being	  made	  in	  one	  venue	  can	  affect	  policymaking	  in	  other	  venues.	  
VII. Conclusion	  The	  case	  study	  of	  Oregon	  field	  burning	  clearly	  demonstrates	  the	  successful	  efforts	  of	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  to	  fend	  off	  policy	  change	  over	  a	  fifty	  year	  period,	  from	  1960	  until	  2010.	  	  This	  group	  achieved	  success	  by	  instituting	  a	  legislative	  lobbying	  campaign	  that	  allowed	  it	  to	  institute	  a	  long-­‐term	  blocking	  strategy.	  	  When	  policy	  change	  became	  imminent,	  the	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  acceded	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  groups	  seeking	  policy	  change,	  but	  did	  so	  on	  their	  own	  familiar	  turf	  in	  the	  legislature.	  	  They	  allowed	  gradual	  drawdowns	  of	  burning,	  knowing	  that	  a)	  new	  technology	  might	  emerge	  to	  eliminate	  the	  need	  to	  burn	  grass	  fields,	  or	  b)	  political	  fortunes	  may	  change	  and	  allow	  for	  a	  later	  reversal	  of	  legislation.	  This	  study	  finds	  support	  for	  the	  for	  the	  AVS	  Framework’s	  theory	  of	  “easy	  choices”	  and	  makes	  additional	  contributions	  to	  policy	  scholarship	  by	  illustrating	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  vested	  interests	  are	  able	  to	  insulate	  their	  policy	  victories	  from	  reversal	  by	  instituting	  long-­‐term	  strategies	  that	  cause	  long	  periods	  of	  institutional	  inertia	  and,	  thus,	  policy	  stability.	  	  Even	  though	  this	  study	  demonstrates	  the	  success	  of	  industry	  groups	  that	  seek	  to	  achieve	  long-­‐lasting	  policy	  stability,	  there	  is	  good	  news	  for	  groups	  that	  are	  seeking	  to	  challenge	  them	  because	  this	  study	  also	  demonstrates	  very	  clearly	  how	  emergent	  or	  disadvantaged	  groups	  can	  use	  their	  legislative	  allies	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  policymaking	  in	  other	  institutional	  venues	  to	  level	  the	  political	  playing	  field	  against	  their	  stronger	  opponents.	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Table	  1:	  Easy	  Venue	  Choices	  	   	   	   Degree	  of	  Venue	  Accessibility	  	  Decision	  Venue	   	  Strength	  of	  Group	  Resources	  
	  Opponents’	  Resources	   	  Opponents’	  Degree	  of	  Dominance	  	  
	  Venue	  Image	  Receptivity	  	  Easy	  “best”	  Choice	   	  High	   	  Low	   	  Weak	  	   	  High	  	  Easy	  “worst”	  Choice	   	  Low	   	  High	   	  Strong	   	  Low	  Adapted	  from	  Ley	  and	  Weber	  (2015).	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Table	  2:	  Oregon	  Seed	  Council	  Venue	  Choices	  	   	   	   Degree	  of	  Venue	  Accessibility	  	  Decision	  Venue	   	  Strength	  of	  Group	  Resources	  
	  Opponents’	  Resources	   	  Opponents’	  Degree	  of	  Dominance	  	  
	  Venue	  Image	  Receptivity	  	  Legislature	   	  Growing	  	  (Med-­‐High)	   	  Diminishing	  (Low)	   	  Weak	  (Neglected)	   	  High	  	  Agency3	  	   	  Low	   	  Low	   	  Weak	   	  Low	  	  Courts	   	  Low	   	  Low	   	  Weak	   	  Low	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Oregon	  Department	  of	  Agriculture	  
